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an employee voluntarily terminated his employment for a per-
sonal reason. But, as noted, the Unemployment Compensation
Act no longer recognizes a "compelling personal reason" as an
exemption to the voluntary termination disqualification. The
Nottelson majority, however, attached a different and crucial
significance to this "reason." The majority held that the reli-
gious nature of the refusal to pay dues triggered the involve-
ment of the federal Civil Rights Act. And once this federal
legislation was called into play, it could, under the right fact
situation, relieve an employee of the obligation to pay dues.
The majority held that the instant case presented such a fact
situation - that there was a reasonable basis to believe that
Nottelson need not pay dues; that he had not acted inconsis-
tently with the employment relationship; and that he had not,
therefore, voluntarily terminated.
The problem this decision presents for DILHR is manifest.
Read narrowly, the decision requires the department to in-
quire into the meritoriousness of an employee's excuse for
particular conduct in light of federal legislation and its judi-
cial interpretation when there is a conflict between Title VII
and a union security clause. Read broadly, however, the deci-
sion requires DILHR to develop an expertise in (and to con-
sider in future decisions) all federal legislation relating to em-
ployment discrimination and its rapidly developing
interpretation in federal case law.102 So broad a mandate
could easily require funding for additional personnel. That, in
turn, would involve the legislature. In view of the closeness of
the decision, it seems likely that the department may wait for
further direction from the court or the legislature before un-
dertaking such an expanded role.
KATHLEEN A. GRAY
LABOR LAW-Fair Representation-Punitive Dam-
ages in Fair Representation Actions. IBEW v. Foust,
442 U.S. 42 (1979). Nearly forty years ago, in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 1 the United States Supreme
102. See notes 68, 85 & 88 supra.
1. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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Court first recognized that the Railway Labor Act2 imposed
upon unions, certified as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of employes within a bargaining unit, the duty to fairly
represent the interests of all members of the unit during the
negotiation, administration and enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements. Further, the Court in Steele determined
that courts had the authority to issue appropriate remedies
for any breach of this duty of fair representation.3 Since that
time, federal courts have been unable to reach a consensus
concerning the circumstances under which punitive damages
may properly be assessed against a union which breaches the
duty of fair representation. In the recent decision of IBEW v.
Foust,4 the Court held that the Railway Labor Act did not
permit an employe to recover punitive damages against a
union which had breached the duty of fair representation by
improperly pursuing a grievance. 5 While some have read the
Foust opinion as formulating a per se prohibition against
awarding punitive damages in all fair representation cases,6 it
would appear, from a careful examination of the language
used by the Foust majority, that the prohibition is limited to
cases in which the union's breach results from a failure to
properly pursue a grievance. Even given a narrower reading,
the Court has taken a valuable and effective tool away from
courts seeking to remedy, deter and punish extreme and out-
rageous union conduct which violates the right of an individ-
ual employe to be fairly represented in pursuance of a griev-
ance. It would seem that the rationale offered by the Court in
Foust falls short of justifying this prohibition of punitive
damage awards.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before addressing the Foust opinion directly, it is neces-
sary to understand the nature and scope of the duty of fair
representation, as well as the manner in which federal courts
2. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
3. 323 U.S. at 199.
4. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
5. Id. at 52.
6. Id. at 52-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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have attempted to remedy breaches of the duty.
A. The Duty of Fair Representation
The duty of fair representation was first enunciated by the
Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 7 when it held
that a union which had been granted the power under the
Railway Labor Act to be the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for employes in a particular bargaining unit had the obli-
gation to fairly represent all employes without regard to the
employe's race or union membership." Similarly, in Vaca v.
Sipes,9 the Court stated that "the exclusive agent's statutory
authority to represent all members of a designated unit in-
cludes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all mem-
bers without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exer-
cise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and
to avoid arbitrary conduct." 10 The Vaca Court further defined
this statutory obligation of unions by holding that "[a] breach
of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." '
7. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
8. Id. at 199.
9. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
10. Id. at 177.
11. Id. at 190. Courts and the NLRB have imposed a number of standards, and
various applications of those standards, on unions in regard to the duty of fair repre-
sentation. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944), the Court
said that a union must represent employes fairly, impartially, in good faith, and with-
out hostile discrimination. Later, the Court added honesty of purpose to the good
faith requirement. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Subse-
quently, the Court said that the duty of fair representation would be breached if
fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct were present. Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 348 (1964). The Court in Vaca cited the NLRB decision in Miranda Fuel
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), in which the terms unfair, irrelevant
and invidious were used. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177-78.
The application of the various standards has led some courts and the NLRB to
place limitations on what constitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation. For
instance, the fact that a union is inept, negligent, ineffectual, insensitive or unwise
will not, by itself, establish a breach of duty. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper
Guild, 239 N.L.R.B. 1321, 100 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1979); Pacific Coast Utilities Service,
Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 99 L.R.R.M. 1619 (1978); Great Western Unfreight System,
209 N.L.R.B. 446, 85 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1974). In fraud and in improper motive cases,
intentional conduct must be proved. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Also,
in grievance cases, unions are not required to investigate the grievance with the ex-
haustiveness in which a skilled investigator would research the disputed incident.
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The statutory duty of fair representation, while originally
developed through judicial interpretation of the Railway La-
bor Act in the Steele case, now clearly extends to all unions
certified under the National Labor Relations Act.12 An ag-
grieved employe may therefore bring a suit against an exclu-
sive bargaining representative, for a breach of the duty of fair
representation, under the Railway Labor Act and the National
Labor Relations Act, including the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959,13 and the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947.'4
The duty of fair representation, as defined by the Court, is
rather broad in scope. The duty exists when the union is ne-
gotiating a new agreement, amending or modifying an existing
agreement, or processing (or failing to process) grievances ini-
tiated by the union itself or by an individual member of the
bargaining unit.15 The duty extends to employment referrals
made by the union"' and to virtually any act or omission that
relates to an employe's wages, hours or working conditions.
The Court, however, recognized in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman,17 that a union must be allowed some flexibility in
its actions, stating that a "wide range of reasonableness must
be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the
unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."I s
Plumbers Local 195, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 100 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1979); Jelco Inc., 238
N.L.R.B. No. 202, 99 L.R.R.M. 1375 (1978).
12. See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Court in foot-
note 8 of Foust recognizes that "[t]he duty of fair representation is also implicit in
the NLRA .... "442 U.S. 42, 46 n.8 (1979).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959). The Court in Murphy v. Operating Engineers,
Local 118, 99 L.R.R.M. 2074 (N.D. Ohio 1978), allowed suit for breach of the duty of
fair representation under the Landrum-Griffm Act.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1947). The Court in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
343 (1964), allowed an employe to raise such action under § 301 of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1947). See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
15. R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAw § 4 at 705 (Ist ed. 1976). See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177.
16. Murphy v. Operating Engineers, Local 118, 99 L.R.R.M. 2074 (N.D. Ohio
1978).
17. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
18. Id. at 338.
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B. Remedies for Breach of the Duty of Fair
Representation
The breach of the duty of fair representation has tradi-
tionally been characterized as a tort, since an action for such a
breach arises when there has been malicious, arbitrary or
fraudulent conduct resulting in an injury to an employe. 19 The
primary remedies for tortious conduct have been compensa-
tory damages and, when the defendant's wrongdoing has been
intentional, deliberate and outrageous, punitive damages as
well. 20 In both the Steele and Vaca cases the Supreme Court
held that the federal courts were free to fashion appropriate
remedies for a union's breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion.2 ' Since then, courts have used a wide variety of remedies
in fair representation cases, including injunctive relief, com-
pensatory damages, damages for mental distress, allowing re-
covery of reasonable attorney's fees, issuing orders to bargain
with respect to certain issues and punitive damages.22
Most controversial among the different types of remedies
granted are punitive damages. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Foust, the federal circuits had been split on the
question of whether, and under what circumstances, punitive
damages could properly be granted in fair representation
cases. Several circuits stressed the need to protect individual
employes from malicious, intentional and outrageous union
conduct, and therefore encouraged the use of punitive dam-
ages where such conduct is present.23 Other circuits stressed
the importance of maintaining the strength of unions as a
whole, as opposed to individual employe rights, and expressed
a desire to achieve industrial harmony without the use of pu-
nitive damages.24
19. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d
281, 286-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
20. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971).
21. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. at 204; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
at 177.
22. R. GORMAN, BAsIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW § 8 at 721-25 (1st ed. 1976).
23. See, e.g., Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Bond v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5 (8th
Cir. 1975); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975).
24. See, e.g., Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D.
Or. 1977).
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In Butler v. Local 823, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,25 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that punitive damages could be awarded
only when a union acted with malice directed specifically at
an employe2 6 More recently, the Eighth Circuit has acknowl-
edged that punitive damages are properly awarded when
union conduct is the type of outrageous or extraordinary con-
duct for which extraordinary remedies are needed.27 Similarly,
the Sixth Circuit has found that punitive damages are recov-
erable when a union has acted in bad faith or maliciously in
its representation of an employe.2 8
In Harrison v. United Transportation Union,9 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that punitive damages were es-
sential in protecting an individual employe's rights, noting
that "[u]nless punitive damages are available, an employe
may lack the strong legal remedy necessary to protect his
right against a union which has either maliciously or in utter
disregard of his rights denied him fair representation."30 The
Second Circuit, in an action arising under the Landrum-Grif-
fin Act,3 1 flatly stated that "[ilf punitive damages can be
awarded against other defendants, they can be awarded
against unions as well."13 2
Among those courts which have denied awards of punitive
damages in fair representation cases are the Third and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals. In Deboles v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.,33 several employes had asserted that certain false
statements made by union officials to the employes regarding
the union's failure to secure equal system seniority rights vio-
lated the union's duty of fair representation. The Third Cir-
25. 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975).
26. Id. at 454.
27. Id. at 454. But see Bond v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5 (8th
Cir. 1975); Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 588 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1978); Emman-
uel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1977).
28. Farmer v. Hotel Workers, Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. 2166 (E.D. Mich. 1978);
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
29. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
30. Id. at 563.
31. Landrum-Griffin Act and LMRDA are one and the same.
32. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union of America, 544 F.2d 1925 (2d Cir.
1976).
33. 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
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cuit Court of Appeals held that "[i]n the absence of actual
injury occasioned by the union's wrongful misstatements, im-
posing liability in the instant case would be punitive and dis-
cordant with the limited remedies available under the [Rail-
way Labor] Act." 4 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Williams
v. Pacific Maritime Association,3 ruled that punitive dam-
ages were not an appropriate remedy in unfair representation-
breach of contract actions.3 6
The United States Supreme Court cast some doubt upon
the authority of the National Labor Relations Board to grant
punitive damages to remedy employer unfair labor practices
in Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB.37 There, the Court stated
with respect to the National Labor Relations Act:
The Act is essentially remedial. It does not carry a penal
program declaring the described unfair labor practices to be
crimes. ... Had Congress been intent upon such a pro-
gram, we cannot doubt that Congress would have expressed
its intent and would itself have defined its retributive
scheme.
The remedial purposes of the Act are quite clear. It is
aimed, as the Act says (Section 1) at encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and at protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, of
self-organization and of negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection
through their freely chosen representatives. 8
Although the Republic Steel case dealt with unfair conduct on
the part of employers, the Court's rationale has been used to
justify the denial of punitive damages in fair representation
cases. In Crawford v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 9 for
34. Id. at 1019.
35. 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 1289. See also Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D.
Or. 1977); Crawford v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 290 (D. Wyo.
1974).
37. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
38. Id. at 10. See also UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), which found the
award of punitive damages to be beyond the authority of the NLRB due to its penal
nature. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 182, which emphasized that federal labor
laws seek to promote industrial peace and the improvement of wages and working
conditions by fostering a system of employe organization and collective bargaining.
39. 386 F. Supp. 290 (D. Wyo. 1974).
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example, a federal district court in Wyoming held that be-
cause the general purpose of the federal labor laws is to sup-
ply remedies rather than punishment, a claim for punitive
damages for a union's failure to fairly represent an employe
could not be allowed. 40
The apparent split between the federal courts, with re-
spect to whether punitive damages are appropriate in fair rep-
resentation cases, formed the basis for the Supreme Court's
decision in Foust.
II. THE Foust OPINION
The Foust case involved an action for the breach of the
duty of fair representation brought by Leroy Foust against
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Foust, a
member of the IBEW and an employe of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, was injured in March of 1970, and re-
ceived a medical leave of absence until December 22, 1970.
His employment was terminated on February 3, 1971, while
he was in the process of attempting to comply with proce-
dures to extend the leave of absence.41
Foust's attorney contacted the union concerning the initia-
tion of grievance proceedings, but despite the fact that the
time limit for filing the grievance-sixty days from the date of
discharge-was only eight days from expiring, as the union
well knew, union officials insisted that Foust himself make the
request of the union. The letter notifying Foust of the neces-
sity to make a formal request was not mailed until sixty-one
days after Foust's discharge. Even though the union eventual-
ly filed the grievance without waiting for a request from
Foust, it did not do so until two days after the sixty day pe-
riod during which grievances could properly be filed under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Since the union had failed to fie the grievance before the
deadline, both Union Pacific and the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board denied Foust's claim.42 Foust thereafter
brought suit against the union and several union officers
claiming they had breached the duty of fair representation. A
40. Id. at 295.
41. 442 U.S. at 43-44.
42. Id. at 44.
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jury awarded Foust $40,000 in actual damages and $75,000 in
punitive damages,4 s and the Federal District Court for Wyo-
ming affirmed the award. 4 The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case, ruling that punitive damages are
properly awardable only if a union has acted wantonly or in
reckless disregard of an employe's rights.45
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict among the circuits with respect to the pro-
priety of awarding punitive damages in fair representation
cases. 4 6 Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the
Court, stating in part:
Because general labor policy disfavors punishment, and the
adverse consequences of punitive damages awards could be
substantial, we hold that such damages may not be assessed
against a union that breaches its duty of fair representation
by failing properly to pursue a grievance. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment below insofar as it upheld the award of
punitive damages.47
The Court offered four reasons for its ruling. First, citing
Steele and Vaca, the Court emphasized that damages in fair
representation suits are designed to make the injured employe
whole. They are compensatory, not punitive.'8 Second, the
Court recognized that the financial burden imposed upon un-
ions by punitive damage awards could operate to deplete
union treasuries, thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions
as collective bargaining agents and jeopardizing the welfare of
all employes. 4'9 Third, the Court noted that the Vaca case had
given unions broad discretion in handling grievances, and that
the threat of punitive damages could "disrupt the responsible
decisionmaking essential to peaceful labor relations."50 Unions
might feel obligated to pursue frivolous grievance claims in or-
der to avoid an award of punitive damages. Finally, the Court
held that the objectives of the National Labor Relations Act
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id.
45. 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978).
46. IBEW v. Foust, 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
47. 442 U.S. at 52.
48. Id. at 48-49.
49. Id. at 49.
50. Id. at 52.
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and the Railway Labor Act were essentially remedial, noting
that general labor policy did not favor punitive measures and
that punitive sanctions had, in the past, been prohibited in
certain unfair labor practice cases.51
The two major questions left in the wake of the Foust de-
cision appear to be: (1) whether the Court's prohibition on pu-
nitive damage awards extends beyond those cases involving a
failure to properly pursue a grievance so as to constitute a per
se rule against punitive damages in all fair representation
cases; and (2) whether the rationale offered by the Court justi-
fies a prohibition of punitive damages.
III. SCOPE OF THE Foust RULE
A concurring opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Blackmun,
and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens, characterized the rule adopted by the Foust majority
as "a per se rule that a union's breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation can never render it liable for punitive damages, no
matter how egregious its breach may be."'5 2 Thus, the concur-
ring Justices read the majority opinion as prohibiting punitive
awards not only when a union had failed to properly pursue a
grievance, but upon any breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion. This same approach has been taken in several lower fed-
eral court cases decided subsequent to Foust.53 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
recently held that Foust prevented a punitive damage award
in a fair representation action brought by a member of a
plumbing union seeking declaration of entitlement to pension
benefits under a trust agreement between the union and the
employer. 54 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in Dian v. United Steelworkers of America,55
found no merit in the contention that Foust, decided under
the Railway Labor Act, did not apply to an action under the
51. Id.
52. Id. at 52-53.
53. See, e.g., Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 616 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); Harris
v. Joint Plumbing Industry Board, 474 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Dian v. United
Steelworkers of America, 486 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
54. Harris v. Joint Plumbing Industry Board, 474 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
55. 486 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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Labor Management Relations Act,56 and therefore denied pu-
nitive damages for a breach of the duty of fair representation
in violation of that Act.57 Most recently, in Wells v. Southern
Airways, Inc.,58 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently
agreed with the view of the concurring Justices when it cited
to the Foust case and held that "[a]n award for punitive dam-
ages against a union for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion is per se invalid. 59
Not all courts, however, have interpreted the Foust opin-
ion as prohibiting punitive damages in all fair representation
actions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under
the Landrum-Griffin Act, "[p]unitive damages are proper
where the plaintiff can establish actual malice or reckless or
wanton indifference to his rights. . .. [P]unitive damages are
permissible to vindicate the invasion of those protected rights
and as a deterrence against future violations by over-zealous
unions and their officers. '6 0 Similarly, in Anderson v. United
Paperworkers International Union,"1 a Minnesota District
Court held that Foust was intended to prohibit punitive dam-
ages only when a union has failed to properly pursue a griev-
ance. The court stated:
It would appear that even if the Court intended to create a
per se rule in Foust, it would apply only where a Union
failed to properly pursue a grievance .... In this case, the
Union breached its [duty of fair representation] by misrep-
resenting to its rank and file members the true effect of their
severance pay provision; based upon such misrepresenta-
tions, the employees consistently ratified successive collec-
tive bargaining agreements with the understanding that,
under any circumstances, they would receive their severance
pay. They would not have ratified the agreements had the
true nature of the severance pay provision been revealed.
Since this case does not involve a failure to pursue an
employee's grievance, this Court finds the ruling in Foust in-
structive, but not specifically controlling.62
56. Id. at 703-06.
57. Id. at 707.
58. 616 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 109 n.1.
60. Bise v. International B'hd of Electrical Workers, Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299,
1305-06 (9th Cir. 1979).
61. 484 F. Supp. 76 (D. Minn. 1980).
62. Id. at 85.
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This latter view appears to be a more reasonable interpre-
tation of the Foust rule than that adopted by the concurring
Justices in Foust and by the Fifth Circuit in Wells. 5 First,
the majority in Foust specifically stated that it meant to "ex-
press no view on the propriety of punitive awards in suits
under the Landrum-Griffin Act."" Thus, to the extent that
fair representation actions may be commenced under the pro-
visions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, the scope of the Foust
rule is not as far-reaching as the concurring Justices appear to
assume. Second, the rule announced in the majority opinion is
carefully worded to encompass only those breaches of the
duty of fair representation which occur by virtue of a union's
failure to properly pursue an employe's grievance.6 5 As the
Anderson court so clearly pointed out, it was the concurring
opinion of Justice Blackmun that labeled the majority's opin-
ion as formulating a per se rule against the rendering of puni-
tive damages for any and all breaches of the duty of fair rep-
resentation."6 The concurring opinion, however, cannot modify
or broaden the majority's rule beyond its explicit terms.
Therefore, as the court in Anderson observed, when a breach
of the duty of fair representation consists of some act other
than improper pursuance of a grievance, the Foust rule, while
providing some guidance in assessing the propriety of punitive
damages, does not prohibit such awards.6
63. 616 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. 442 U.S. at 47 n.9.
65. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, limited the holding only to cases in-
volving a breach of the duty of fair representation in failing to properly pursue a
grievance. He did so on two occasions, most notably in the holding itself, in which he
said, "we hold that such damages may not be assessed against a union that breaches
its duty of fair representation by failing properly to pursue a grievance." 442 U.S. at
52. Earlier, in stating the issue, Justice Marshall had noted that the case involved the
improper processing of a grievance, and said, "The question presented is whether the
Railway Labor Act permits an employee to recover punitive damages for such a
breach of a union's duty of fair representation." Id. at 43. (footnote omitted).
66. 484 F. Supp. 76, 85 (D. Minn. 1980); 442 U.S. at 52-53 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
67. See note 62, supra.
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IV. THE Foust RULE: IS A PROSCRIPTION OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES JUSTIFIED?
While the scope of the Foust rule may not be entirely
clear, there is no doubt that the majority intended to outlaw
punitive awards, at least when a union had failed to properly
pursue a grievance.68 It was precisely on this point that the
concurring opinion took issue with the majority.6 9 The concur-
ring Justices favored overturning the punitive damages
awarded in Foust on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed
to show anything more than negligent conduct on the part of
the union, thereby rendering the case an improper one in
which to take punitive measures.7 0 In their view, the major-
ity's apparent per se prohibition of punitive awards was, at
best, unnecessary and, at worst, unwise.7 1 In order to deter-
mine whether the majority was justified in prohibiting puni-
tive awards, it is necessary to evaluate the reasons given for
the formulation of the Foust rule, and weigh them against
whatever advantages there may be to punitive damage awards
in fair representation cases.
The first reason the majority gave for denying the punitive
damage award in Foust was that it read the Steele and Vaca
opinions as adopting a "compensation principle" under which
a union's liability could extend no further than necessary to
render the injured employe whole.72 The Court stated that
Steele had approved only the "'resort to the usual judicial
remedies of injunction and award of damages,' ,,73 while Vaca
refused to hold unions liable for damages attributable solely
to the conduct of the employer in order to "avoid burdening
unions beyond the extent necessary to compensate employees
for their injuries . . . . Mr. Justice Blackmun, however,
found the majority's reading of Steele and Vaca somewhat
strained, and argued that the cases do no more than "stand
for the proposition that a worker injured by his union's breach
68. 442 U.S. at 52.
69. Id. at 53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 49.
73. Id. (quoting Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. at 207) (emphasis
added by Foust Court).
74. Id. at 50.
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of duty must at least be made whole." 5 Upon careful analy-
sis, the latter appears to be a somewhat more plausible char-
acterization of the Steele and Vaca holdings.
Although the Steele opinion did refer to usual remedies,
there is no indication that the Court meant to exclude dam-
ages to the extent they rise above full compensation. As previ-
ously noted, a breach of the duty of fair representation has
generally been characterized as tortious conduct.7 ' When tor-
tious conduct is intentional, deliberate and outrageous, all but
a few courts have permitted juries to award punitive or exem-
plary damages as a means of punishing the wrongdoer and de-
terring others from engaging in similar conduct.7 7 As at least
one federal court has noted:
[U]nfair representation suits are in the nature of tort. Ele-
ments necessary to prove unfair representation - subjective
bad faith or arbitrary conduct - are elements normally con-
sidered when punitive damages are awarded in the ordinary
tort action. Since bad faith and arbitrariness exist in varying
degrees, it is conceivable that in cases of extreme conduct
punitive damages should be considered in fashioning an ap-
propriate remedy.78
Thus, punitive damages are not at all an "unusual" rem-
edy when tortious conduct is of an intentional and malicious
nature. Moreover, almost every federal court" to have consid-
ered the propriety of punitive damages in fair representation
cases prior to the Foust decision recognized the appropriate-
ness of such awards when union conduct had been outrageous,
extreme, extraordinary, malicious, wanton, willful, reckless or
in bad faith.80
75. Id. at 54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
76. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
514 F.2d 442, 447 (8th Cir. 1975).
77. W. PROssaR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971).
78. Tippett v. Ligget & Meyers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292, 298 (M.D.N.C.
1970).
79. It should be noted that extensive research showed no state cases on the issue
at hand. This is due to the fact that almost all cases are either initiated in federal
court or removed to federal court.
80. See Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1978); Emmanuel
v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1977); Harrison v.
United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976);
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Likewise, there seems little reason to believe that the Vaca
opinion was intended to proscribe the use of punitive awards
in the event of intentional and outrageous union conduct. In
Vaca, the Court overturned a jury award of both compensa-
tory and punitive damages on the grounds that "all or almost
all" of the employe's damages were attributable to the em-
ployer and not the union."" Therefore, the Court held only
that a union may not be charged with punitive damages if not
liable for compensatory damages. It may reasonably be in-
ferred from this ruling that when a union is held liable for
compensatory damages in a fair representation action, it may
be taxed with punitive damages as well.8 2 Thus, the Foust ma-
jority's first reason for prohibiting punitive damages is not en-
tirely persuasive.
The second rationale advanced in support of the holding in
Foust was that punitive awards could do great financial dam-
age to unions, thereby impairing their effectiveness as collec-
tive bargaining agents.8 3 Once again citing to Vaca, the major-
ity noted that the Court there had been concerned with the
"hardship" imposed upon the union by the jury's award of
damages.8 ' As Mr. Justice Blackmun pointed out, however,
the hardship referred to by the Vaca Court was not the
spector of financial ruin, but rather, the injustice which inevi-
tably results when a defendant is held liable for damages at-
tributable solely to the conduct of another.8 5 The opinion
makes no mention of fiscal soundness, depletion of union trea-
suries, or impairment of union effectiveness in collective
bargaining.8 6
Bond v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Butler v. Local
823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 454 (8th Cir. 1975); Dill v. Greyhound
Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970); Farmer v. Hotel Workers, Local 1064, 99
L.R.R.M. 2166 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Murphy v. Operating Engineers, Local 18, 99
L.R.R.M. 2074 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Scott v. Teamsters, Local 377, 96 L.R.R.M. 2902
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Woods v. Local 613, IBEW, 404 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 383 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
81. 386 U.S. at 198.
82. See 442 U.S. at 55 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 50-51.
84. Id. at 50.
85. Id. at 56-57. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
86. The majority in Foust stated that Vaca found "considerations of deterrence
insufficient to risk endangering the financial stability of such institutions." Id. at 50.
The majority cited page 198 of the Vaca opinion for that proposition, but no refer-
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Even if the financial stability of unions was a legitimate
concern of the Court, the propriety of a ban on punitive dam-
ages must be questioned. The Foust majority recognized that
under the damage apportionment formula enunciated in
Vaca, unions would seldom be liable for more than nominal
damages.87 Thus, were the Court to allow punitive awards in
fair representation cases, only in those rare instances when
union conduct had been extreme and outrageous will damages
of any magnitude be awarded. Even then, there is little reason
to worry about a union's financial stability. It is a well ac-
cepted proposition that a defendant's wealth is a relevant fac-
tor in determining the amount of a punitive damage award.8
Further, courts have generally been mindful of the fact that
"punitive damages must serve to deter, not to destroy, and
must be imposed in a rationale [sic] manner, bearing in mind
the particularities of each defendant."89 Obviously, a punitive
damage award imposes some hardship on a union. But pre-
sumably, this is the purpose of punitive damages - without
some degree of hardship, no punishment or deterrent effect
can be achieved. Therefore, it would appear that the Court
could have best protected both the financial stability of un-
ions, and the rights of individual employes, simply by admon-
ishing lower courts to avoid excessive damage awards, rather
than prohibiting such awards altogether.
The Court's third reason for denying punitive damages in
Foust was that such a remedy could upset the careful and re-
sponsible decision-making process, essential to labor relations,
by limiting the broad discretion currently afforded unions in
handling grievances.90 In Vaca, the Court had rejected the no-
tion that employes could force a union to process claims irre-
ence to "financial stability" could be found there.
87. Id. at 48. Under the damage apportionment formula of Vaca, a union will be
liable in a fair representation action only for its breach, and not for damages that
arise solely from the fault of the employer. 386 U.S. at 197. It is also interesting that
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that if an employer has not acted wrong-
fully, a union will not be held liable for breach of its duty of fair representation,
because the employe suffered no damage. St. Clair v. Local 515, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 442 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
88. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 2 at 14 (4th ed. 1971).
89. Murphy v. Operating Engineers, Local 18, 99 L.R.R.M. 2074, 2133 (N.D. Ohio
1978).
90. 442 U.S. at 51.
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spective of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
and ruled that a union satisfied its obligation to fairly rep-
resent employes if it did not "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion . . . ..." The
Foust Court, drawing from this rationale, concluded that pu-
nitive damages could impinge on unions' discretion, since
"[i]n order to protect against a future punitive award of un-
foreseeable magnitude, unions might feel compelled to process
frivolous claims or resist fair settlements. 9 2 However, it
would appear that the availability of punitive damages has lit-
tle to do with union discretion. The basic duty of fair repre-
sentation remains the same, with or without punitive dam-
ages; so long as a union does not act in an arbitrary or
perfunctory manner, it will not be liable for a breach of its
duty to fairly represent employes. Moreover, "[niot every de-
fault by the union that constitutes a breach of its duty of fair
representation necessarily amounts to that aggravated con-
duct for which . . .punitive damages may be awarded."93 A
"wide range of reasonableness"'" must still be applied when
examining and evaluating a union's conduct. Punitive damage
awards are inappropriate unless extreme and outrageous con-
duct on the part of the union can be shown." As Mr. Justice
Blackmun opined, "[a] little chilling of union 'discretion' in
those cases would not bother me."9
The majority's final reason for rejecting the punitive dam-
age award in Foust was that the federal labor policy was es-
sentially remedial in nature, thereby rendering punitive sanc-
tions inappropriate.9 The Court relied, in part, on Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB9 8 in coming to this conclusion. The Re-
public case, however, held only that Congress had not con-
91. 386 U.S. at 191.
92. 442 U.S. at 52.
93. Segarra v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1978) (footnote
omitted).
94. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
95. See Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382 (8th Cir.
1977); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975);
Bond v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Dill v. Grey-
hound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970).
96. 442 U.S. at 58 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
97. 442 U.S. at 52.
98. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
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ferred the power upon the National Labor Relations Board to
impose punitive damages against an employer who had com-
mitted an unfair labor practice.9 9 Unlike the laws involved in
Republic, the duty of fair representation is a judicially cre-
ated doctrine, °100 and the Court, in both the Steele and Vaca
cases, recognized the authority of federal courts to furnish ap-
propriate relief upon a union's breach of the duty." ' The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had advocated the use of ex-
emplary damages, stating:
"The very basis for the existence of unionism in our society
today is the promise of employment to those who desire to
associate freely in order to obtain it. The right of the work-
ing man to the benefits of collective bargaining is too essen-
tial and valuable to be hindered, impeded and seriously
damaged by irresponsible and dictatorial leaders whose
dominance in any given situation does great disservice to the
purpose and principles of unionism. When that right of free
association is usurped by a concerted, malicious effort to de-
prive the individual of the safeguards built into the organi-
zation, it cannot be condoned .... Imposition of exemplary
damages, when the requisite elements of malice, gross fraud,
wanton or wicked conduct, violence or oppression are pres-
ent, serves to achieve the deterrence they were designed to
effect.M02
Given the strong need to protect individual employes from
extreme and outrageous union conduct, it would seem that
punitive damages would be consonant with, rather than an-
tithetical to, national labor policy.
V. CONCLUSION
In IBEW v. Foust, the United States Supreme Court held
that punitive damages were not available in fair representa-
tion cases in which a union had failed to properly pursue a
grievance. While the Foust opinion has been read as placing a
99. Id. at 10.
100. 442 U.S. at 47.
101. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944).
102. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir.
1968) (quoting Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 A.D.2d 331, 334-35, 239 N.Y.S.2d 792, 796
(1963)).
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per se prohibition on punitive awards in all fair representation
actions, it would appear that Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority, was careful to apply the proscription on punitive
damages only when a union had improperly pursued a griev-
ance. The rationale of the Court, however, should be instruc-
tive to lower courts seeking to remedy other kinds of breaches
of the duty of fair representation.
Irrespective of the intended scope of the Foust rule, any
prohibition of punitive damages in cases in which employe
rights may have been violated by extreme and outrageous
union conduct seems unjustified. Since the Court probably
could have achieved its objectives without banning punitive
damages altogether, there would seem to be no reason for dis-
allowing such an effective vehicle for deterring extreme and
outrageous union conduct and protecting the rights of individ-
ual employes.
ROBERT J. BARTEL
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